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ABSTRACT 
Digital health in the United States is rapidly and continuously evolving to enhance patient 
care and revolutionize health care delivery. This technology offers substantial promise to 
both patients and providers, but lacks a comprehensive regulatory structure to ensure ade-
quate safety and privacy. While the Department of Health and Human Services, the Food 
and Drug Administration, and the Federal Trade Commission regulate portions of the 
digital health industry, their oversight is incomplete, with numerous digital health compa-
nies falling between the cracks and assuming an unregulated status. This article analyzes 
the state of digital health legal and regulatory oversight in the United States, discusses how 
state legislatures and industry organizations have worked to fill existing legal gaps, and 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The boundaries and applications of digital health are rapidly evolving. From wearable fit-
ness sensors to ingestible pills to Internet-connected pacemakers and insulin pumps, dig-
ital health has the potential to transform the health care sector and revolutionize patient 
care. The benefits from digital health are undeniable: patients can assume greater respon-
sibility for the management of chronic conditions while accessing medical care at their 
convenience and in their own homes.1 Technology-based health care can further reduce 
the costs of care and help address the physician shortage across America.2 These benefits 
are a significant incentive to increase the adoption of mobile and digital technology in the 
health care industry, and the rate of this adoption is only projected to increase.  
While digital health offers substantial promise, it suffers to some extent from a lack of 
comprehensive regulation. This regulatory gap presents potential concerns both for pa-
tients—who may not be provided with appropriate protections—and for the industry, 
which will see compliance, operational and strategic challenges in designing products that 
meet with existing standards, potential future regulation, and consumer and regulator ex-
pectations. Privacy laws in the United States are sectoral and patchwork in nature, and 
those related to health care have not been significantly revised to address technological 
innovation. Privacy and security for digital health applications are therefore in flux, with 
some subsections of the industry unregulated by federal law. This article analyzes the 
scope and gaps of health care privacy and security laws in the United States and discusses 
available privacy and cybersecurity frameworks that exist for unregulated health care ac-
tors. 
II. WHAT IS DIGITAL HEALTH? 
 
The term digital health, at its most basic, refers to the intersection of health care and the 
Internet. Digital technologies that fall within this category are broad, and may include 
mobile health (mHealth), health information technology (HIT), wearable devices, tele-
medicine, the Internet of Things (IoT), and personalized medicine.3 While these technol-
ogies serve different functions—for example, HIT includes electronic health records and 
e-prescribing whereas IoT concerns sensors that interact between humans and machines 
to collect relevant health care data for diagnosis and disease management—they share one 
	
		
1  See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., EXAMINING OVERSIGHT OF THE PRIVACY & SECURITY OF 
HEALTH DATA COLLECTED BY ENTITIES NOT REGULATED BY HIPAA 2 (2016), 
https://www.healthit.gov/sites/default/files/non-covered_entities_report_june_17_2016.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 20, 2018, 01:30 PM). [hereinafter HHS HIPAA OVERSIGHT REPORT] 
2  Jeff Lagasse, With Physician Shortage Looming, Hospitals Turn to Telehealth Tools, HEALTHCARE FINANCE 
(June 1, 2018), https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/physician-shortage-looming-hospitals-turn-
telehealth-tools (last visited Aug. 20, 2018, 01:35 PM). 
3  Charlotte A. Tschider, Enhancing Cybersecurity for the Digital Health Marketplace, 26 (1), ANNALS HEALTH 
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fundamental overriding goal: to use technology as a method for improving health care 
and increase the access and quality of medical services.  
The advent and adoption of digital health has the potential to profoundly impact the 
health care economy over the next several decades. To date, the United States has spent 
approximately 18% of its Gross Domestic Product on health care every year, and this fig-
ure is expected to increase to 20% by 2025.4 Digital health, however, is simultaneously ex-
pected to grow by a compounded annual growth rate of 26% in the upcoming years, and 
is projected to top $379 billion by 2024.5 These anticipated technological developments 
in the health care space may increase pressure to create and implement lower-cost health 
care solutions and incentivize companies to continue developing digital health products.6 
Significant shifts in the delivery of health care could be witnessed over the next several 
years. 
III. DIGITAL HEALTH RISKS 
 
Although the benefits of digital health are undeniable, concerns exist regarding the pri-
vacy and security of data collected through digital technologies. Like all digital platforms, 
Internet-connected health care devices pose privacy and security risks for their users. First, 
digital health applications collect and store patient health data, which may contain ex-
tremely sensitive information. Without proper security safeguards, this personal data may 
be unlawfully accessed by unauthorized users, resulting in a breach of personal infor-
mation. Such a breach not only harms the business and reputation of the digital device 
manufacturer, but also exposes critically sensitive patient data. There is no shortage of bad 
actors attempting to access medical data. Indeed, health data is one of the most lucrative 
objects for sale on the black market, fetching higher prices than social security numbers 
and financial information.7 Thus, the traditional data breach risk that is present with any 
Internet technology is amplified in the health care context due to value-laden sensitive 
data.  
Second, device interoperability and network connectivity bring the possibility for new 
attack vectors and vulnerabilities.8 A network hosting interconnected devices exponen-
tially expands its attack surface such that a security flaw or breach in any device operates 
as a backdoor entry point into the entire system.9 These digital health devices weaken the 
	
		
4  Id. at 3. 
5  Keith Speights, What Is Digital Health?, MOTLEY FOOL (May 9, 2017, 7:04 AM), https://www.fool.com/in-
vesting/2017/05/09/what-is-digital-health.aspx (last visited Aug. 20, 2018, 01:37 PM). 
6  Tschider, supra note 3, at 4. 
7  See generally PRESIDENT’S NAT’L SEC. TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMMITTEE, NSTAC REPORT 
TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE INTERNET OF THINGS ES-1 (Nov. 19, 2014), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/de-
fault/files/publications/NSTAC%20Report%20to%20the%20President%20on%20the%20Inter-
net%20of%20Things%20Nov%202014%20%28updat%20%20%20.pdf (last visited Oct. 23, 2018, 01:35 PM). 
8  Id. at 7. 
9  See id. at 1. 
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overall security of a medical IT network by their mere presence on the network, and fur-
ther create access points that must be monitored and evaluated by the organization’s tech-
nology team. Unauthorized access into a network further has the potential to compromise 
data integrity, which can negatively impact patient care and treatment plans.  
Finally, digital health offers a unique risk that is not present with all Internet-based plat-
forms: bodily harm. Digital health devices that are implanted into a patient’s body, such 
as a cardiac pacemaker, may use the Internet to receive signals or instructions from a health 
care provider. Hijacking a pacemaker could allow an unauthorized third party to manip-
ulate the device’s functionality and cause significant bodily harm or death. This same sce-
nario is present with digital insulin pumps, where device hijacking could alter the dose of 
insulin a patient receives.  
Thus, digital health presents privacy, security, and resiliency risks that must be addressed 
and mitigated. These risks are increasingly being discussed in public policy circles, with 
the widespread recognition that technology advances faster than policy. The result is a 
crucial gap between legal frameworks and technological reality that heightens the security 
and privacy risks associated with digital health technology. 
IV. DIGITAL HEALTH LEGAL & REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
Digital health in the United States does not exist in an unregulated environment. Rather, 
the United States has adopted a sectoral approach to privacy that vests regulatory author-
ity for the health care sector with three federal government agencies (in addition to po-
tential regulation in each of the states): The Department of Health and Human Services 
(HHS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC). In terms of privacy and security, HHS’s Office for Civil Rights (OCR) plays a 
dominant role in its enforcement of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability 
Act (HIPAA).10 HIPAA represents the main legal framework addressing privacy and se-
curity requirements for the health care industry, and its applicability to digital health tech-
nologies is the focus of this article. In addition to HHS, the FDA regulates the efficacy 
and safety of medical “devices”,11 and has proposed voluntary cybersecurity guidance for 
connected medical devices.12 Finally, the FTC has broad non-industry-specific enforce-
ment powers that stem from Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC 
Act).13 Pursuant to the FTC Act, the FTC may regulate unfair and deceptive trade prac-
tices in or affecting commerce. While the FTC Act does not specifically mention privacy, 
	
		
10  See HHS HIPAA OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 1, at 3. 
11  Medical Device Overview, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last updated Sept. 14, 2018), 
https://www.fda.gov/forindustry/importprogram/importbasics/regulatedproducts/ucm510630.htm (last 
visited Aug. 28, 2018, 01:58 PM). 
12  See Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices - Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug 
Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (Jan. 22, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm482022.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2018, 01:53 PM). 
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the FTC has brought numerous cases under Section 5(a) alleging that companies have en-
gaged in deceptive acts by failing to adhere to their stated privacy policies and procedures. 
This article next considers the scope and gaps of these regulatory frameworks as applied 
to digital health technology, and discusses efforts by state legislatures to bridge these gaps. 
 
A. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act: Scope & Applicability 
 
In 1996, Congress passed the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act to en-
hance the portability of health insurance coverage and reduce the administrative costs and 
burdens associated with health care delivery.14 Neither of these primary goals were di-
rected at privacy and security—instead, the privacy and security rules that resulted from 
the HIPAA law were not discussed in any substantive way in the HIPAA statute. Instead, 
when Congress failed to step in and create a privacy and security law, HHS (later supple-
mented by the Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act 
(HITECH Act)), created federal regulatory protections for the privacy and security of 
certain health information in certain settings when held by certain entities—with the 
scope of these rules defined by the “non-privacy” goals of the HIPAA statute.15 The 
HIPAA Privacy Rule sets forth required limitations on the use and disclosure of pro-
tected health information (PHI),16 while the HIPAA Security Rule mandates administra-
tive, technical, and physical safeguards for electronic PHI.17 Essentially, HIPAA seeks to 
protect health information by prohibiting disclosures of information that are unlawful 
or unauthorized, and ensuring that applicable health care entities enact reasonable and 
appropriate security safeguards for the data they collect or store.  
While the scope of HIPAA appears broad, its privacy and security requirements apply 
only to health care organizations that qualify as “covered entities.”18 A covered entity is 
any health plan, health care provider, or health care clearinghouse, as those terms are stat-
utorily defined (again, driven by concerns about portability and administrative simplifi-
cation and not privacy or security).19 In 2009, the HITECH Act extended HIPAA’s pro-
visions to “business associates,” which include persons or organizations that perform cer-
tain functions on behalf of a covered entity involving the use or disclosure of PHI—es-
sentially, service providers to these covered entities where the services involve individual 
information.20 PHI, in turn, is defined as individually identifiable health information 
	
		
14  Kirk J. Nahra, HIPAA Privacy and Security for Beginners, WILEY REIN (July 2014), 
https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-5029.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2018, 01:55 PM). 
15  See id. 
16  See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502; DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, SUMMARY OF THE 
HIPAA PRIVACY RULE 1 (last revised May 2003), https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/privacysum-
mary.pdf?language=en (last visited Aug. 28, 2018, 02:05 PM). 
17  See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.308-312. 
18  See, e.g., 45 C.F.R. § 164.502. 
19  Id. § 160.103; Nahra, supra note 14. 
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that a covered entity or its business associate holds or transmits in any form or media.21  
The foundational principle of HIPAA is that a covered entity or business associate may 
not use or disclose PHI except as either expressly permitted in the Privacy Rule, or as au-
thorized by the patient in writing. A covered entity is only required to disclose PHI in 
two circumstances: (1) to the patient herself when requested; and (2) to HHS as part of a 
compliance investigation or enforcement action.22 A covered entity is permitted—but 
not required—to disclose PHI without first obtaining the patient’s authorization (with 
presumed consent under the HIPAA Privacy Rule) for the “core” purposes of the health 
care system—treatment, payment, and performance of health care operations (TPO) (es-
sentially the administrative operations of a health care business).23 There also are various 
“public policy” rationales for the use and disclosure of PHI.  All other uses and disclosure 
of PHI not expressly permitted by the Privacy Rule require an individual’s written au-
thorization. 
 
B. HIPAA and Digital Health Technology: Assessing the Gaps 
 
Although HIPAA may appear at first blush to be a comprehensive privacy framework for 
the health care industry, it has significant gaps and limitations when applied to digital 
health technology.24 First, HIPAA’s protections only extend to digital health actors that 
qualify as covered entities. When HIPAA was originally drafted, HHS only had authority 
to create a privacy rule applicable to covered entities such as health care providers and 
health insurers.25 This means organizations that do not qualify as covered entities or busi-
ness associates typically have no obligation to comply with HIPAA’s requirements. For 
example, a company manufacturing a fitness tracker that collects basic health information 
such as height, weight, and biometric data, would not be subject to HIPAA’s regulations 
because the company provides this product directly to an individual consumer without 
the involvement of a doctor or health insurer. The company does not provide or pay the 
cost of an individual’s medical care, does not provide medical services, and does not pro-
cess non-standard data received from another entity into a standardized format (e.g., bill-
ing companies, community health management information systems, etc.). In other 
words, the company is not a covered entity (i.e., it is not a health plan, a health care pro-
vider, or a health care clearinghouse). Thus, this company would fall outside the bounds 
of HIPAA’s privacy and security regulations despite the fact that it collects sensitive 
health data.  
	
		
21  Id. 
22  Id. § 164.502; Nahra, supra note 14. 
23  45 C.F.R. § 164.502; Nahra, supra note 14. 
24  See HHS HIPAA OVERSIGHT REPORT, supra note 1, at 20; Kirk J. Nahra, What Closing the HIPAA Gaps 
Means for the Future of Healthcare Privacy, HITECH ANSWERS (Nov. 9, 2015), 
https://www.hitechanswers.net/what-closing-the-hipaa-gaps-means-for-the-future-of-healthcare-privacy-2/ 
(last visited Aug. 28, 2018, 03:14 PM). 
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Second, HIPAA only protects and regulates PHI. PHI refers to individually identifiable 
health information (including demographic data) that relates to a person’s physical or 
mental health, the provision of health care services to that individual, or payment for 
health care services, and that identifies the individual or would provide a reasonable basis 
for identification.26 Health care data that does not satisfy this definition may be collected, 
used, and disclosed by a company without running afoul of HIPAA. For example, where 
health information has been de-identified or aggregated without disclosing individual 
identifiers, it does not constitute PHI and may be disclosed without an individual’s con-
sent or authorization.27 In State ex rel. Cincinnati Enquirer v. Daniels, for instance, the 
Ohio Supreme Court held that the Cincinnati Enquirer could obtain copies of lead-con-
tamination notices issued by the Cincinnati Health Department.28 The court found that 
the notices did not reveal PHI even though they referenced an unnamed child whose 
blood test showed an elevated lead level.29 Similarly, guidance on HHS’s website notes 
that merely reporting the average age of health plan members is not PHI because the ag-
gregated data does not identify any individual plan member.30 
These limitations in HIPAA’s scope present large regulatory gaps when applied to the 
digital health sector (except in those situations where a digital health product is provided 
directly by a HIPAA covered entity or in a business partnership with a provider or in-
surer). Today, with minor exceptions, most digital health companies do not qualify as 
covered entities or business associates, and remain unregulated by HIPAA. Similarly, 
some of these organizations may collect sensitive health data that does not qualify as PHI. 
When either of these scenarios occurs, the digital health company is not subject to 
HIPAA’s privacy and security regulations, and may operate with significantly less federal 
oversight. The regulatory scheme created by HIPAA focuses largely on which entity holds 
the data, and not on the nature or sensitivity of the information being collected. This, in 
turn, allows a significant portion of the digital health sector to avoid compliance with 
these crucial HIPAA privacy and security standards. 
 
C. FDA, FTC, and Medical Device Regulation 
 
In addition to HHS’s oversight of HIPAA, the Food and Drug Administration assumes 
a key role in the regulation of medical devices, including Internet-connected medical tech-
nology. The FDA’s role, however, is limited primarily to ensuring the safety and efficacy 
of certain classifications of devices, and not all mobile or digital technologies will trigger 
	
		
26  Id. § 160.103. 
27  Id. § 164.502(d). 
28  844 N.E.2d 1181 (Ohio 2006). 
29  Id. at 523; Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Health v. Lipson O’Shea Legal Group, 50 N.E.3d 499, 501 (Ohio 2016) 
30  Guidance Regarding Methods for De-Identification of Protected Health Information in Accordance with the 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule, DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN 
SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/ocr/privacy/hipaa/understanding/coveredentities/De-
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FDA scrutiny.31 Moreover, FDA regulations are not typically geared towards protecting 
patient privacy or security. While the FDA has released voluntary guidance “for managing 
postmarket cybersecurity vulnerabilities for marketed and distributed medical devices,” 
this guidance is not mandatory.32 The FDA does not require cybersecurity testing for any 
device, and relies on the device manufacturer to perform any voluntary security testing.33 
Further, the FDA does not regulate device privacy, leaving such devices to be covered (if 
at all) by HIPAA.  
Similarly, the Federal Trade Commission has played a crucial part in privacy policy, en-
forcement, and best practices since the 1970s.34 The FTC is an independent federal agency 
responsible for protecting consumers and promoting competition. While the FTC is not 
specific to health care, its regulatory authority extends to unfair and deceptive acts or prac-
tices, which may occur in the health care industry.35 In particular, the FTC can bring en-
forcement actions to halt violations of privacy and security laws. The FTC has brought 
more than 500 enforcement actions to protect consumer privacy, and these actions ad-
dress a wide range of issues, including spyware, mobile devices, file sharing, and spam.36 
Cases may also involve non-adherence to a privacy policy. Similarly, the FTC has initiated 
over 60 cases since 2002 against companies that failed to adequately protect consumers’ 
personal data.37 In this manner, FTC’s authority is broad, but is not directed at preventing 
or regulating privacy and security standards in the health care industry. Instead, FTC acts 
as a watchdog to enforce existing privacy and security standards, but does not create those 
standards. Thus, while FTC may enforce existing privacy and security laws in the digital 







31  See Kirk J. Nahra, New York Attorney General Addresses Key Health Care Privacy Gaps, WILEY REIN (Apr. 
2017), https://www.wileyrein.com/newsroom-newsletters-item-April_2017_PIF-NY_AG_Ad-
dresses_Key_Health_Care_Privacy_Gaps.html (last visited Aug. 28, 2018, 03:15 PM). 
32  Postmarket Management of Cybersecurity in Medical Devices - Guidance for Industry and Food and Drug 
Administration Staff, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION 4 (Dec. 28, 2016), https://www.fda.gov/down-
loads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/ucm482022.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 28, 2018, 01:43 PM). 
33  Adam Brand, Closing the Gap in Medical Device Cybersecurity, PROTIVITI (Jan. 3, 2018), https://blog.protiv-
iti.com/2018/01/03/closing-gap-medical-device-cybersecurity/ (last visited Aug. 28, 2018, 01:43 PM). 
34  Protecting Consumer Privacy and Security, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, https://www.ftc.gov/news-
events/media-resources/protecting-consumer-privacy-security (last visited Sept. 29, 2018, 04:33 PM). 
35  See Privacy & Data Security Update:2017, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, at 1 (Jan. 2017 – Dec. 2017), 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/privacy-data-security-update-2017-overview-commis-
sions-enforcement-policy-initiatives-consumer/privacy_and_data_security_update_2017.pdf (last visited 
Sept. 29, 2018, 04:19 PM). 
36  Id. at 1-2. 
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D. State Regulatory Frameworks 
 
As the gaps associated with federal legislation become more apparent, states have begun 
stepping in to ensure comprehensive privacy and security standards apply to digital 
health. In March 2017, for example, New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman an-
nounced that his office settled three cases with various mobile health applications for in-
sufficient or inappropriate privacy practices, and misleading privacy and security claims.38 
In bringing these cases, New York acted to fill a regulatory gap in FDA oversight—these 
digital health devices had not triggered FDA review—and the HIPAA Privacy Rule.39 
Specifically, although digital health devices were being used in these cases, the companies 
did not qualify as covered entities and, therefore, no federal privacy structure governed 
these organizations. The New York Attorney General stepped in to ensure privacy pro-
tections would be applicable to these digital health applications despite the absence of a 
comprehensive federal regulatory structure.40 Such action signifies a potential shift to-
ward “regulation through enforcement,”41 which states may begin to use more frequently 
if federal privacy and security standards are not properly updated. 
In addition to New York’s enforcement action, states have also begun implementing leg-
islation to patch the holes in federal regulations. The most recent and innovative action 
by a state is S.B. 327, a cybersecurity bill governing Internet of Things devices in Califor-
nia.42 California Governor Jerry Brown recently signed this bill into law, making it the 
first state in the nation to adopt IoT legislation. This new law, which becomes effective 
on January 1, 2020, will mandate that any manufacturer or developer of a “smart” de-
vice—including connected health devices—ensure that the product is equipped with rea-
sonable security features to protect the device and the information it houses.43 Advocates 
of the bill hope that the new law will focus nationwide attention on the issue of IoT se-
curity, which extends beyond state boundaries.  
Legislation, such as S.B. 327, is intended to bridge gaps in federal regulatory frameworks. 
Whereas a digital health company may escape HIPAA’s grasp because it does not qualify 
as a covered entity, the company would still be subject to minimum privacy and security 
standards if it conducts business in California. The goal of such legislation is to minimize 
opportunities for organizations to collect sensitive data without being subject to some 
form of regulatory structure simply because the pace of technological innovation out-
paces policy discussions.  
As the nation reacts to S.B. 327, it will be interesting to observe whether other states im-
plement comparable legislation, and whether upcoming bills will spur the federal legisla-
ture to create a comprehensive regulatory framework. Addressing privacy and security for 
	
		
38  Nahra, supra note 31. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Senate Bill No. 327 (Cal. Sept. 28, 2018), available at https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavCli-
ent.xhtml?bill_id=201720180SB327 (last visited Sept. 29, 2018, 03:19 PM). 
43  Id. 
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digital health and other Internet-connected devices on a state-by-state basis risks incon-
sistent standards and approaches, which could make it more difficult for digital health 
companies to determine their obligations, duties, and responsibilities. Comprehensive 
federal legislation could add consistency and predictability to privacy and security stand-
ards in digital health. However, until the federal legislature takes action, such standards 
will have to be developed and enforced by states and industry organizations. 
V. THE DANGERS OF NON-REGULATION 
 
Inconsistent or non-regulation of health care entities presents numerous risks that are un-
acceptable to both organizations and patients. Importantly, the lack of a mandatory reg-
ulatory regime may lead some digital health companies to avoid basic privacy and security 
practices altogether and endanger patient data. In many instances, economic incentives 
can cause digital health companies to push their devices to market with little consideration 
for security measures.44 These devices, in turn, may be particularly susceptible to hacking, 
which can lead to the unauthorized acquisition of patient health data. Moreover, these 
devices may operate on larger health care networks and create backdoor entry points to 
accessing data from an entire health system that is otherwise secure. Such devices not only 
jeopardize the confidentiality and integrity of their own users’ data, but also have the po-
tential to create widespread breaches of health data at larger institutions.  
Moreover, consumers are often not equipped to understand the difference between cov-
ered entities and non-covered entities and how this distinction drives digital health com-
pliance. Instead, consumers may assume that their sensitive health data is protected and 
that adequate security measures will protect them from harm despite a contrary reality. 
The current regulatory framework assigns consumers the hardship of understanding the 
applicability of complex legal regulations to protect their own privacy and security.  
Consumers, however, are not the only group harmed by gaps in digital health regulation. 
Digital health innovators and entrepreneurs are also adversely affected. In particular, hav-
ing separate rules that apply to covered and non-covered entities can create confusion 
among tech innovators as to whether their products would be regulated under federal 
frameworks. This uncertainty may result in hesitant investors, which can delay or stifle 
technological innovation in the health care industry.45 Further, a breach from lax security 
practices may cause immense reputational damage to the digital health company. 
VI. ENCOURAGING COMPLIANCE 
 
While federal regulatory compliance may not be mandatory for a large portion of the dig-
ital health industry, digital health companies should nonetheless ensure they are adhering 
to adequate privacy and security standards. The reason for this is, at a minimum, three-
	
		
44  See Paul Merrion, DHS Warns Insecure Internet of Things Could Spur Product Liability Lawsuits, CQ ROLL 
CALL WASH. DATA PRIVACY BRIEFING (Nov. 16, 2016), available at 2016 WL 6774799. 
45  Alexis Guadarrama, Mind the Gap: Addressing Gaps in HIPAA Coverage in the Mobile Health Apps Indus-
try, 55 (4) HOUSTON LAW REVIEW 999, 1017 (2018). 
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fold. First, consumers expect minimum privacy and security standards to be associated 
with their products, and can negatively impact a company’s market share if that company 
fails to satisfy consumer expectations. Second, it is inevitable that unregulated digital 
health companies will eventually be subject to a privacy and security regulatory scheme. 
While the form of this comprehensive regulatory framework is currently unknown, the 
risks associated with unregulated digital health products are too great to leave this indus-
try unattended. This has become evident with California’s implementation of S.B. 327—
if the federal legislature does not act, states will. Companies that delay implementing basic 
privacy and security standards now will be adversely impacted if a new regulatory struc-
ture takes effect. Moreover, it is likely that regulations for digital health companies will 
mirror privacy and security best practices in effect today. Digital health companies have 
the opportunity now to build strong compliance programs and privacy policies, which 
will result in a smooth transition under future regulations.  
Finally, by participating in the privacy and security dialogue today, digital health compa-
nies can help establish the standards and requirements for future regulations that will 
govern their industry. Public-private stakeholder participation is actively encouraged as 
policymakers think through how to regulate new technologies without stifling innova-
tion.46 By engaging with privacy and security concerns today, digital health companies 
can advocate for regulations that will promote their business interests while protecting 
consumer data.  
The question then becomes which frameworks should digital health companies adhere to 
when implementing privacy and security standards? The obvious choice is HIPAA, par-
ticularly for data security, even though its requirements are not yet mandatory for a sig-
nificant portion of the digital health industry. As an established framework governing 
health care privacy and security compliance, HIPAA contains sufficient flexibility to 
adapt to varied circumstances and organizations, including digital health. By voluntarily 
complying with HIPAA (or trying to meet its standards where they make sense for the 
business), digital health companies can ensure they are implementing best practice stand-
ards in effect for the health care industry. Such compliance will also create consistency 
across the health care sector and avoid inconsistent application of privacy and security 
rules. Consumers will be better able to gauge their privacy and security rights and reme-
dies with uniform implementation of HIPAA’s rules. Indeed, numerous experts have 
counseled in favor of expanding HIPAA’s reach to the digital health industry.47 The 
downside to voluntary compliance with HIPAA, however, is not only the costs associated 
with implementing adequate standards, but also the concern that the traditional TPO 
model of disclosure under HIPAA may not fit well with consumer facing products. 
An alternative is for digital health companies to implement industry-created cybersecurity 
	
		
46  See Bethany Corbin & Megan Brown, Partnerships Can Enhance Security in Connected Health and Beyond, 
CIRCLEID (Dec. 14, 2017, 8:30 AM), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20171213_partnerships_can_enhance_se-
curity_in_connected_health_and_beyond/ (last visited Sept. 30, 2018, 05:19 PM). 
47  See Mary Butler, Is HIPAA Outdated? While Coverage Gaps and Growing Breaches Raise Industry Concern, 
Others Argue HIPAA is Still Effective, 88 J. AHIMA 14 (2017), 
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frameworks. Many HIPAA-regulated entities also follow one or more security frame-
works developed by industry professionals to enhance the security and availability of pa-
tient data. Numerous frameworks exist, enabling digital health companies to adopt the 
framework that best meets their organizational structure and needs. The 2018 HIMSS 
Report surveyed health care organizations and identified the five primary security frame-
works in use throughout the health care industry today:48 (1) National Institute of Stand-
ards and Technology (NIST);49 (2) Health Information Trust Alliance (HITRUST);50 
(3) Center for Internet Security (CIS) Critical Security Controls;51 (4) International Or-
ganization for Standardization (ISO);52 and (5) Control Objectives for Information and 
Related Technologies (COBIT). 53  Adoption of one of these voluntary cybersecurity 
frameworks will assist digital health companies with remaining up-to-date on cybersecu-




Digital health represents an advantageous development to enhancing patient wellness and 
health care delivery in the United States. With the potential to lower medical costs and 
serve broader patient populations, digital health is only projected to grow in the coming 
years. As this technological frontier develops, it is crucial that federal regulations evolve 
to safeguard patient privacy and security. The current regulatory framework for the 
health care industry contains significant gaps that exclude a majority of digital health com-
panies from necessary federal oversight in their data collection practices. As Congress con-
siders the most effective method to remedy these gaps, digital health companies should be 
proactive in their approach to privacy and security, including voluntary compliance with 
HIPAA and industry-created cybersecurity frameworks. Such proactive behavior not 
only promotes consumer confidence in the digital health company, but also enables the 




48  HIMSS, 2018 Himss Cybersecurity Survey, 18 (2018), 
https://www.himss.org/sites/himssorg/files/u132196/2018_HIMSS_Cybersecurity_Survey_Final_Re-
port.pdf (last visited Sept. 28, 2018, 02:49 PM). 
49  National Institute of Standards and Technology, Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecu-
rity Version 1.1 (Apr. 16, 2018), https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/CSWP/NIST.CSWP.04162018.pdf (last vis-
ited Sept. 28, 2018, 03:19 AM). 
50  CSF Version 9.1, HITRUST, https://hitrustalliance.net/hitrust-csf/ (last visited Sept. 21, 2018, 10:35 AM). 
51  Download the CIS Controls V7 Today, CENTER FOR INTERNET SEC., https://learn.cisecurity.org/20-con-
trols-download (last visited Sept. 21, 2018, 11:03 AM). 
52  ISO 27001 - Information security management systems, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARD-
IZATION, https://www.iso.org/isoiec-27001-information-security.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2018, 10:42 AM). 
53  COBIT 4.1: Framework for IT Governance and Control, ISACA, https://www.isaca.org/knowledge-cen-
ter/cobit/Pages/Overview.aspx (last visited Sept. 21, 2018, 10:44 AM). 
